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The evolution of computer science has exposed us to the growing gravity of security
problems and threats. Dynamic taint analysis is a prevalent approach to protect a program
from malicious behaviors, but fails to provide any information about the code which
is not executed. This paper describes a novel approach to overcome the limitation of
traditional dynamic taint analysis by integrating static analysis into the system and
presents framework SDCF to detect software vulnerabilities with high code coverage. Our
experiments show that SDCF is not only able to provide efficient runtime protection by
introducing an overhead of 4.16× based on the taint tracing technique, but is also capable
of discovering latent software vulnerabilities which have not been exploited, and achieve
code coverage of more than 90%.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
In the last decade, software vulnerabilities have threatened computer security severely. Malicious users are able to gain
access to confidential information inside the target program, even take control of it by taking advantage of design flaws.
Take notorious buffer overflow as an instance, attackers can exploit this software vulnerability bymanipulating the software
input, and cause an overwrite in the stack in order to control the execution stream of the program [1].
Taint analysis is a prevalent approach to detect malicious behavior in recent years. Based on the concept that some data
(such as the input from the user) is not trustworthy, taint analysis is proposed to keep track of the data which can be used
to harm the software, and monitor suspicious actions. There exists several researches concerned with taint analysis and the
details will be described in Section 2.
In current researches, the taint analysis technique is usually realized as a runtime method and referred to as dynamic
taint analysis. Regardless of the implementation of the dynamic taint analysis, there is one limitation in current researches.
Due to the fact that the dynamic taint analysis can only detect software vulnerabilities when the attack has been launched,
it is impossible to locate the latent software weak spots, which is very desirable in many cases.
An example is presented in Fig. 1 to show the motivation of our approach. This vulnerability is exposed as CVE-2007-
6454, and described with C++ code for clarity while our system is implemented to handle binary. PeerCast is an open source
streaming media multicast tool. HandshakeHTTP is a procedure in PeerCast to handle http packages. The input package is
controlled by users. The programmer attempts to copy the password and other information from the input package into two
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Fig. 1. A typical form of software vulnerability.
member variables of a Servent object by using library function strcpy. However, the procedure fails to verify whether the
source string is longer than the destination string. It means there exists a vulnerability of heap overflow and the procedure
allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via a long source request. Line 23
and 26 are the vulnerable spots. However, the traditional dynamic taint analysis approaches cannot detect the potential
threat when the code in these spots is not reached in execution.
In the field of dynamic taint tracking, there are also testing based techniques attempting to detect a potential security
threat by improving the code coverage [2]. However, thorough static analysis is expensive and inaccurate [3]. High code
coverage is difficult to achieve [4] till now, and the testing costs too much time.
1.2. Contribution
To address the problems described in the prior subsection, this paper proposes a novel approach, and realizes it as a
framework. Moreover, we verify the practicality of the framework by building a vulnerability discovery tool on it.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• Propose SDCF (Static and Dynamic Combined Framework) as a framework combining static and dynamic analysis.
This paper presents a novel approach composing the static and dynamic analysis to integrate their advantages, and
provides SDCF as a framework for thorough analysis of the target program.
• Implement a tool to detect latent software vulnerabilities.
We present and evaluate LSVD (Low-overhead Software Vulnerability Detector), an SDCF based tool to discover software
vulnerabilities. LSVD cannot only detect software vulnerabilities being exploited at runtime, but also find the unexecuted
code containing weak spots.
2. Related work
2.1. Dynamic taint analysis
Since most of the malicious users attack the software by manipulating the input, an intuitive approach to protect the
software is monitoring the input from the user as tainted data [5–7]. Much attention has been drawn to suspicious data
trackingwith dynamic taint analysis. There are several binary instrument tools like DynamoRIO [8], Pin [9] and Valgrind [10]
which can be used to facilitate taint tracking.
Newsome and Song [11] describe a dynamic-taint based approach to prevent overwrite attacks. Their approach taints
any data read from a network socket which receives data from users. During execution, the approach monitors the binary
program and guarantees that tainted data is not used as the destination of a control transfer instruction (such as jmp), a
format string, or a system-call argument.
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James Clause provides a generic dynamic taint analysis framework Dytan [5] and addresses several problems. Dytan is
able to handle the data flow and control flow in its taint analysis. The system is also flexible and does not require any special
support from the runtime system. LIFT [12] is also presented for the similar goal of providing a facility to keep an eye on the
tainted data when the software is being executed.
Tools like IntScope [13] and Panorama [7] monitor the behavior of the target code by means of dynamic tainting. They
are designed to detect integer overflow [14] and malware. Nguyen-Tuong and his colleagues [15] apply this approach in
PHP-based web applications.
There are also researches applying the technique to generate test cases which are more well-targeted [2].
Generally, dynamic taint analysis supervises the behavior of the unsecured data at runtime to detect attacks aiming at
the vulnerabilities of the software. However vulnerabilities cannot be detected by the technique until the target program is
under attack.
2.2. Combining static and dynamic analysis
Since the static analysis is able to achieve high code coverage with low accuracy, and the dynamic analysis is just the
opposite, there are already several researches attempting to integrate these two techniques in order to neutralize their
drawbacks and maximize their advantages.
A direct way to compose the static and dynamic method is analyzing the target program in both ways and synthesizing
the results. Ashish Aggarwal [16] presents a system on this principle. The system implements a static module to cover most
of the code and testing based dynamic module to deal with the problems which can only be solved at runtime, such as
pointer aliasing. The paper does not mention the time cost, yet it is difficult to achieve high efficiency by checking the code
with both the static method and testing.
Recent research in this field shows great interest in directing test case generation with static analysis. Yannis
Smaragdakis [17] has also made many contributions to static directed testing. He and his colleagues have proposed a series
of tools [18] to generate the test cases with the assistance of static analysis. Saner [19] is a tool to detect vulnerabilities in the
sanitization routines of web applications with a similar principle. Its efficiency evaluation shows that approximately only
50 lines of code can be analyzed per second on average.
Considering that dynamic analysismay incur great runtimeoverhead,Walter Chang andCalvin Lin [20] propose a solution
invoking static analysis that identifies program locations where security policy violations might occur in order to reduce
instrumented code. This solution requires source code to be recompiled which is not available for most of the vendor
software. Different from SDCF, security violation is detected by their solution only when vulnerable code is executed.
Bouncer [21] applies dynamic analysis to static slicing for reducing false positives and summarizes library functions in
order to reduce sliced instructions. Compared with SDCF, dynamic analysis is the secondary approach of static analysis.
BitBlaze [22] describes another form of the combination of the static and dynamic approach. The authors implement
Vine, the static module of BitBlaze to translate the assembly instructions into intermediate language (IL) and gain important
information such as control flow graphs (CFG). They implement their dynamic module TEMU for extracting OS-level
semantics and user-defined dynamic taint analysis. BitBlaze integrates the two modules with Rudder which can leverage
the information gathered by the previous modules to generate inputs traversing different execution paths.
3. System design
The presentation of the SDCF framework structure consists of 5 parts. The first part provides the overview of our general
method and the architecture. Dynamic taint analysis and static analysis are described in the next two subsections followed
by optimization detail. At last, the implementation of LSVD is briefly introduced.
3.1. Analysis architecture
Fig. 2 shows the system overview of the framework. All clients built on SDCF could define suspicious data as a taint source
through Taint Source Interface, and track their propagation. An Illegal Behavior Definition Interface is provided for the client
to define the dangerous behavior which the client may be interested in.
Binary Monitor is implemented on the dynamic instrumentation platform DynamoRIO [8] to monitor the target binary
program dynamically. Dynamic Taint Analyzer is used to track the dynamic taint propagation during execution. At the same
time, static analyzer analyzes the unexecuted part of the target program by the static approach. At last, the information
about both executed and unexecuted parts of the program are provided to the client. The client on SDCF can acquire the
information from the dynamic and static module, and this mechanism enables the client tools to apply analysis on the
target program with high code coverage.
We apply an API filtering mechanism to filter uninterested API functions without analysis and improve the performance
of the system. As most of the security attacks are aimed at the EXE module or third party libraries instead of other modules,
the API Filter can be used to skip those API functionswe are not interested in order to reduce the runtime overhead. However,
the dynamic taint analyzer still works in these API functions to guarantee the accuracy of the taint tracking. The details of
API filtering will be introduced in the following.
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Fig. 2. Architecture overview.
3.2. Dynamic taint analysis
Dynamic taint analysis is an important part of our approach to analyze theprogramdynamically. Generally, this technique
marks input data from unsafe channels as tainted, tracks the information flow and manages taint propagation as many
similar works do [5]. In this way, the behavior of the target program can be analyzed and presented.
At the beginning, our approach locates the client-defined taint source in the memory and registers which are most likely
referred to input data from some unsafe channels such as opening files and network packages. For instance, buffer overflow
vulnerability detection tool LDCF is designed to locate thememory address of the taint source from opening files by tracking
I/O-relevant APIs (such asCreateFileW,CreateFileMapping andMapViewOfFile) andmark the buffer that stores the data of taint
source as tainted. For example, when a.txt document is opened, it is mapped to a block of memory with starting address
0x00b00000 and the length 4096 bytes. Taint Initializer gets the data of both 0x00b000000 and 4096, andmarks the related
memory area tainted.
After the taint source is located, information flow tracking begins to work. Information flow tracking is implemented
on the instruction level. Up to now, we do not care about SSE/MMX instructions. Meanwhile ring0 instructions are also
ignored because DynamoRIO cannot trace them in the kernel space. The remaining instructions can be grouped into two
types according to their behaviors. One type of instruction can cause taint propagation such as themov instruction and the
push/pop instruction. Information flow tracking marks any data derived from tainted data as tainted when dealing with
these type of instructions. The other type of instruction such as cmp and test instructions are considered not to affect taint
propagation and are skipped in our framework.
For the first type of instruction, we only take care of the tainted or untainted states of source operands instead of their
concrete values. Take the first mov instruction shown as follows for example, source operands are classified as general-
purpose registers, memory locations and immediate values. Any tainted general-purpose registers and memory locations
used in the source operand will make destination operands tainted. Otherwise, destination operands are marked untainted.
However, one special situation should be taken into consideration. For the second xor instruction, no matter whether the
source operand is tainted or not, the destination operand eax is set clean. In this case, eax is set untainted after the execution
of this instruction.
mov r32, r/m32/imm32
xor eax, eax
In order tomanage the taint propagation,memory and registermodels should be built to record tainted states ofmemory
and registers. Because during the whole analysis process, most of memory addresses are untainted, and a chaining hash
Table 3 is used to record memory tags (only tainted memory tags are recorded). Every node in the hash table represents
one tainted memory byte in the target programs virtual address space. Normally there are 4096 slots in the hash table, and
125k nodes in a slot. The number of slots and nodes in a slot can be changeable. When there are 512 million slots and only
one node in a slot, the hash table becomes the one-to-one mapping strategy. If any byte of memory is tainted, our approach
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Table 1
Samples of APIs taint effects.
Function name Module name RetValueNum RetValueLength ParamNum TaintType
GetModuleHandleA Kernel32.dll 1 32 1 ⟨1, ret⟩
SetLastError(NTDLL.RtlSetLastWin32Error) Kernel32.dll 0 0 1 ⟨1, null⟩
lstrlenW Kernel32.dll 1 32 1 ⟨1, ret⟩
CloseHandle Kernel32.dll 1 32 1 ⟨1, null⟩
RemoveDirectoryW Kernel32.dll 1 32 1 ⟨1, null⟩
UnmapViewOfFile Kernel32.dll 1 32 1 ⟨1, null⟩
CreateFileW Kernel32.dll 1 32 7 ⟨1, ret⟩
LoadStringW User32.dll 1 32 4 ⟨1, ret⟩, ⟨1, 2⟩, ⟨1, 3⟩
CharUpper User32.dll 1 32 1 ⟨1, ret⟩
_initterm MSVCRT.dll 1 32 2 ⟨1, ret⟩
wcsncpy MSVCRT.dll 1 32 2 ⟨2, 1⟩, ⟨2, ret⟩
Table 2
Coverage of SDCF in SPEC CINT2006.
Target program Total BB Executed BB Complemented BB Missed BB Complement rate (%) Coverage (%)
bzip2 24.7 12.7 8.5 3.5 70.8 85.8
gcc 16.8 10.6 6.1 0.1 98.4 99.4
mcf 27.3 12.9 9.4 5 65.3 81.7
gobmk 22.6 11.4 8.8 2.4 78.6 89.4
hmmer 20.7 10.8 6.5 3.4 65.7 83.6
sjeng 16.7 8.2 5.2 3.3 61.1 80.2
libquantum 26.2 13.8 8.3 4.1 66.9 84.3
h264ref 21.3 12.3 9 0 100 100
omnetpp 22.1 13.7 8.4 0 100 100
astar 17.6 10.8 6.2 0.6 91.2 96.6
Average 21.6 11.7 7.6 2.2 79.8 90.1
Table 3
Vulnerability detection result.
Target program Attacks Attacks detected Normal test Latent bugs detected Source
BufferAttacker 11 11 41 41 Example program
TxtEdit 13 13 20 7 Example program
IrfanView 4.25 31 31 12 3 CVE-2010-1509
Foxit Reader 3.0 build 1120 22 22 23 17 CVE-2009-0836, CVE-2009-0837
handles it as follows: First, find which slot it belongs to by its memory address. Second, create a node in the slot, and record
its memory address in the node. If a piece of tainted memory is cleaned, we delete the nodes in the table.
In Register Management, normally 1 bit is used to represent the state of a register (1 means tainted and 0 means not).
However, there is a special relationship between registers: some registers are part of others. That means when the state of
a register is changed, other registers may be affected. Let us take this short code for an example:
mov eax, ecx
mov ax, 4
Assume that ecx is tainted. After the first instruction, eax is tainted, and ax, ah, al should all be tainted too. At the second
instruction, an immediate is moved to ax, so ax is cleaned. Because ah and al are part of ax, at this time, they should all be
untainted. However, eax is still tainted. For accuracy, that relationship must be taken into consideration.
3.3. Static analysis
The goal of unexecuted information supplement is to complement unexecuted code and information within the function
of the target program statically during the process of dynamic taint analysis.
Fig. 3 presents the algorithm of this module to supplement unexecuted code. The static analyzer is working during the
process of dynamic taint analysis. While the program is running, CG (Call Graph) is being built and for each function in the
CG, the CFG (Control Flow Graph) of executed code will be constructed. At the same time, branch points like conditional jmp
will be added to the branch point list of the function for the use of static completion analysis. After the function is visited by
the dynamic taint analysis, all branch points will be traversed, and the structure of the target program will be constructed
by applying the algorithm described in Fig. 3. For the sake that different parameters passed into the function may lead to
different control flow and therefore different discovery of CFG, CFG is built each time a function is called. Considering that
the static analysis is applied to intra-procedure as mentioned later, it is efficient to generate CFG on-the-fly and it is proved
by our experiments. As shown in Fig. 4, SDCF also generates visualized CFG for the user for manual analysis.
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Fig. 3. Algorithm of unexecuted information supplement. For each function in the Call Graph, the unexecuted information supplement will traverse the
branch point list and complement unexecuted branch paths statically.
Fig. 4. CFG of a function generated by SDCF. The concrete path indicates the execution stream, and the dotted ones are supplemented by the static analyzer.
Since the structure of the program is acquired, the static analyzer is able to apply taint analysis on the unexecuted part
of the code which cannot be reached by the dynamic taint analysis module. Similar to dynamic analysis, static analysis is
context-sensitive and it analyzes the whole CFG by traversing each unexecuted path of it. As the experiments show in the
first of the fourth section, this part of the code is usually not very large. Moreover, with the help of dynamic analysis, many
of them can be skipped by API summaries as discussed in Section 3.4 because they are irrelevant to the tainted data. It
is notable that the static analysis in SDCF is more accurate than most of the other static approaches because the runtime
context information such as memory and register concrete values at the entry of the unexecuted code is achieved during
dynamic analysis. However, this information also limits the scope of the static analysis, because they can be dissimilar in
different instances. Although the static analysis is not sound enough due to the lack of accurate context information of the
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Fig. 5. The taint behavior policy of API filter. In these formulas, TR stands for the taint relation in the target function, which are represented as taint vectors
⟨Dst, Src⟩. TS is the set of the tainted data in the system scale, which records all the locations which are tainted, and should be monitored. TDst and TSrc are
the taint marks of the corresponding variables.
unexecuted code and it may still produce both false negatives and false positives, it has greater advantage of scalability and
performance.
We implement this part of the system focused on individual functions and ignore the effect of cross-functions. On one
hand, tracking a program path within cross-functions statically will cause a lot of runtime overhead, which makes the
program analysis framework unpractical. On the other hand, if it is desirable to analyze across the function, the cross-
function analysis can be realized in the client tools by integrating the information about individual functions provided by
SDCF.
3.4. Optimization
According to the common observation, a large part of the binary codes in software is loaded from the system library
such as kernel32.dll, USER32.dll and ntdll.dll. The behavior of these modules is predictable, so it is not necessary to check
every instruction in them. Walter Chang and Calvin Lin [20] bring forward an approach to eliminate unnecessary dynamic
tracking with the help of inter-procedure static analysis. However their approach requires a powerful static analysis with
inter-procedure pointer analysis that leverages semantic information. Bouncer [21] is a tool that reduces sliced instructions
by summarizing library functions with symbolic executionwhile state explosion is a serious problem of symbolic execution.
Different from these solutions, we propose a simple, intuitive and efficient solution to optimize the analysis technique by
summarizing the taint effects of the API functions and skipping them.
In the first place, source code or documents of APIs are examined and their taint propagation information is gathered.
Some API taint effects samples are shown in Table 1. Column RetValueNum and ParamNum represent the return value
number and parameters number of each API. RetValueLength represents the length of the return value. TaintType shows
the taint propagation of each API. For example, ⟨1, ret ⟩means the tainted state propagates from parameter 1 to the return
value and ⟨1, 2⟩ means tainted state propagates from parameter 1 to parameter 2. After taint effects of API functions are
summarized, some principles are designed to provide the taint behavior policy of an API filter. (1) When a function can
propagate the tainted data among its parameters and return a value, then the destination of the tainting should be marked
as tainted and brought into the supervision of the system. (2) When the tainted data can be eliminated within the function,
then the system will mark them as clean ones after this function has ended. (3) When a function does not do anything in
the taint propagation, then the taint status of the program does not change, and this function will be considered as a taint
irrelative one. These policies are described in Fig. 5.
With the principles mentioned above, taint irrelative API functions can be free from instrumentation of information flow
tracking code. However, some functions cannot be simply skipped, such as strcpy, which has a tight relationship with some
software vulnerabilities. Therefore, this kind of API function is still necessary to be analyzed in the information flow tracking.
3.5. LSVD
The vulnerability discovery tool LSVD is designed to detect the vulnerabilities regardless of whether it is executed or not.
With dynamic taint analysis and static analysis in SDCF, important information of both executed and unexecuted code are
reported to the client for analysis. LSVD makes use of the information to discover not only the possible weak points in the
executed part of the program, but also the latent software vulnerabilities which have not been executed. It is realized with
the conception that tainted data cannot be used as a parameter of the string handling APIs (such as the printf family) or
source operand of repeat move instructions (such as REP MOVS) without checking its length. Because the length checking is
difficult to identify, most of the traditional methods treat all these dangerous behaviors as potential threats [12].
Since LSVD is built as a client on top of SDCF, the taint source and illegal behavior are defined to detect vulnerabilities.
By the default setting, the inputs from the users are initialized as the source of the taint propagation. LSVD also takes
data loaded from outside of the executable file as untrustworthy.
Althoughmuchworkhas beendone to judgewhether or not the security andprivacy of the programhas been jeopardized,
there is still no mature theory to determine exactly what behavior will cause the trouble. The completeness and soundness
of current taint sink policy in the state of the art cannot be guaranteed yet. Based on this fact, we conclude the illegal taint
related behavior (which is also referred as taint sink) as follows.
• Control transferswhose destination address is determined by the tainted data are dangerous.
The most intuitive approach to take direct control of the victim is by manipulating the target address of the control
transfer instructions, such as jmp, call and ret. For example, malicious users usually cause buffer overflow to overwrite
the system reserved stack, and modify the return address of the current function. By this means, the users are able to
change the control flow of the program at will.
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• Repeat move instructions are a potential threat to the target programwhen ecx is controlled by the outside data. rep movs
is an instruction to move the data repeatedly, and the time of the move is indicated by ecx. If ecx has been controlled by
the users’ input, these instructions may devastate the execution of the program. By analyzing the contents in the target
program, the users can overwrite the data which are not supposed to be accessed.
• Several APIs such as strcpy and sprintf are frequently exploited by malicious users.
Our approach is implemented on binary code, and it is quite natural to define the illegal behavior at the instruction
level. However, a common observation is that large proportions of existing vulnerabilities are caused because of the
inappropriate use of the APIs, many of which include an incomplete check of the parameters. Take strcpy as an example,
this function copies the data between locations indicated by the parameters, but when the destination is not big enough
to store the whole content from the source, an overflow has been induced. The overflow can cause an overwrite to a
location other than the one the destination parameter indicates. Except for unauthorized data access, this behavior can
also result in manipulation of control flow.
3.6. Case study
This case study is performed on theweakness coming from CVE-2007-6454which is shown as ourmotivation in Fig. 1. The
programmer firstly checks whether the input http package is a source request and then attempts to copy the password and
other information from the input package into two member variables of a Servent object by using library function strcpy.
The procedure allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via a long source
request. Line 23 and 26 in Fig. 1 are the vulnerable code.
Fig. 6 is the control-flow graph of the source code. In order to detect the vulnerability mentioned above, our approach
will mark the memory area of the user-controlled http object as tainted. Assume that the input http package is constructed
arbitrarily and it may not reach the vulnerable code. It means that the vulnerable code is not executed at runtime and
not analyzed by SDCF dynamically. During the process of dynamic analysis, the call graph is constructed as well as the
dynamic control-flow graph of the procedure handshakeHTTP. The condition statement in Line 6 of Fig. 1 takes the false value
when executed. After the condition statement is analyzed, the remaining code along the unexecuted branch is constructed
and analyzed by our approach. The whole control-flow graph of the binary code is shown in Fig. 7. SDCF tracks the taint
propagation statically by using the taint analysis result before the condition statement. When the statements in Line 23 and
26 of the source code, or in the basic block starting with the address 0x0040158E and 0x004015AD, is reached, a report
containing a detected heap overflow vulnerability is made by using the policy mentioned before.
4. Evaluation
Since SDCF is designed to discover the latent flaws in the target software, there are generally three concerns about it:
• How much of the target program can be covered for analysis in the framework?
• How is the performance of the system?
• Is SDCF capable to detect software vulnerabilities, even when they are not actually executed?
Therefore, the evaluation of our system is divided into three subsections to answer these questions respectively. We
demonstrate the efficiency and the effectiveness with the experiments on SPEC CINT2006, a set of benchmarks widely used
in performance evaluation.
4.1. Coverage
To evaluate the analysis coverage for target programs, SPEC CINT2006 benchmarks are used to evaluate SDCF in 6
aspects, including total BB (total basic block), executed BB (number of dynamically executed basic blocks), complemented
BB (number of complemented basic blocks), missed BB (number of basic blocks which are not recognized in the static
procedure), complement rate and coverage (coverage rate). Total BB, executed BB, complemented BB and missed BB are
the average number of the corresponding BB in analyzed functions. The complement rate reflects how many basic blocks
are complemented compared to all unexecuted basic blocks. Coverage depicts executed and complemented basic block
percentage of all basic blocks in the target program.
Table 2 shows the result of coverage evaluation and it presents the average of the BBs of the functions in each benchmark.
On average, the complement BB rate of SDCF is 79.8% and coverage reaches 90.1%. The reason why they are not 100% is that
SDCF cannot handle the indirect control transfer which depends on the context.
4.2. Performance
Fig. 8 presents the normalized execution time (the ratio of our time to native execution time) of SDCF applied on the
SPEC CINT2006 benchmarks. SDCF incurs 4.16 times overhead on average and the overhead without the optimization of
API filtering is 6.51. Compared to the taint analysis tools such as LIFT (slows down target programs by 3.6 times), Dytan
(50 times), Panorama (20 times), our system incurs relatively low runtime overhead which benefits from our optimization
mechanism.
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Fig. 6. The control-flow graph of the vulnerable procedure’s source code.
4.3. Vulnerability detection
In this part of evaluation, we test the SDCF based software vulnerability detection tool LSVD on some programs to validate
the practicability of our framework, and Table 3 provides the results.
IrfanView is a free graphic viewer for the Windows platform and Foxit Reader is a widely used document processor, in
both of which buffer overflow vulnerabilities are reported [23]. BufferAttacker and TxtEdit are example programs containing
typical buffer overflow weak spots in their code.
The ‘‘Attacks’’ and ‘‘Attack Detected’’ volume show the number of test cases which cause buffer overflow and whether
they are detected. With our mechanism described at the end of Section 3, all these malicious behaviors are discovered.
The ‘‘Normal test’’ and ‘‘Latent Bugs Detected’’ demonstrate the number of normal test cases which do not bring out buffer
overflow and if the weak spots will still be found.
In SDCF, static analysis will only be applied based on the structure of functions, so it only acquires static information of
the functions being executed, and skips the ones without being called in the execution. It is quite obvious that the latent bug
detecting rate in IrfanView and TxtEdit is lower than the other two, because the functions which contain vulnerable code
may be not even called in these programs.
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Fig. 7. The generated control-flow graph of the vulnerable procedure’s binary code.
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Fig. 8. The performance of SDCF. The measurement is normalized with ‘‘Original’’ execution of the benchmarks in the SPEC CINT2006. ‘‘SDCF’’ and ‘‘SDCF
NO_AF’’ presents the execution time with and without API filtering mechanism respectively.
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5. Discussion
In this section, we discuss strengths and limitations of our approach SDCF.
5.1. Strengths
The main strengths of SDCF are as follows:
• Low overhead.
High runtime overhead is a prevalent limitation of many existing dynamic analysis tools. Benefited from DynamoRIO,
the dynamic instrumentation framework and our optimization module, SDCF is able to achieve better performance.
DynamoRIO significantly reduces the overhead of context switching between the original code and the instrumented
code by basic block optimization. And we implement the API filter to decrease the time wasted on taint irrelative code,
and make our system more practical.
• High code coverage and precise analysis result.
Compared to traditional dynamic taint analysis approaches, SDCF is capable of analyzing with high code coverage.
With the assistance provided by the static analysis engine, unexecuted paths of programs are brought in for analysis.
Meanwhile, runtime information such as concrete value and branching address is made use of for amore precise analysis
result than traditional static analysis tools.
5.2. Limitations
The main limitations of SDCF are as follows:
• Coarse static taint analysis.
Dynamic taint analysis is sound, however, static taint analysis is unsound because the value of the memory object is
unknown and indirect addressing results in undetermined memory address during the static taint analysis. It is difficult
to define a precise static taint propagation model. According to our case studies, it is effective enough of the static taint
analysis engine to detect software vulnerabilities with high performance. The reason is that our static analysis technique
is the supplement of the dynamic taint analysis and it is applied to inner-procedure analysis.
• Incomplete and unsound sink policy.
As mentioned in Section 3, our taint sink policy is incomplete and unsound, which may cause some false negatives and
false positives. In the current stage, the illegal behavior definition interface is designed by SDCF for a new sink policy
defined by the client application. In this way, our approach is very flexible in vulnerability detection. One of our future
works is to improve the existing sink policy by summarizing common malicious behavior, and we are looking forward
to a mature theory being established on this subject.
6. Conclusion
In order to discover the latent software vulnerabilities before they are exploited, we provide a novel approach to combine
the static and dynamic analysis. The SDCF framework is presented to demonstrate our methodology and a buffer overflow
discovery tool LSVD is built on it to validate the practicability of the framework. The result of the experiments on benchmarks
shows that the system is both efficient and effective. In the future, program slicingwill be applied to optimize the framework.
Symbolic execution is also considered to be implemented to extend the utility of the framework.
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